Terror group turns to propaganda after battlefield failures

After enduring decades of military pressure, leadership losses and collapsing operational structures, al-Qaeda has attempted adapting its strategy to changing regional and global realities.

The network, once focused heavily on direct warfare, territorial control and large-scale attacks, increasingly relies on influence campaigns, ideological propaganda, covert networking and psychological warfare.

Intelligence pressure, targeted operations, internal fragmentation and operational losses have significantly weakened the organization's ability to conduct coordinated military activities.

Al-Qaeda no longer possesses the capability to wage conventional and large-scale military confrontations after repeated battlefield defeats, said Ali Akbar Muhammadi.

The organization now seeks to preserve its presence through propaganda efforts, decentralized structures and indirect influence campaigns rather than direct confrontation, he told Salaam Times.

"The group has concluded that direct confrontation brings heavy costs and large casualties, while influence campaigns can continue with lower expenses, more time and reduced risks," Muhammadi said.

"Their focus is now centered on propaganda, psychological warfare, gradual recruitment and maintaining covert connections," he added.

Mohammadi emphasized that this strategic transition does not resolve al-Qaeda's longstanding structural and organizational weaknesses affecting its overall operational effectiveness.

Weak leadership, internal distrust, organizational fragmentation and limited coordination continue restricting the network's ability to function cohesively, he said.

Structural failures and military erosion

Analysts argue that al-Qaeda's repeated military failures stem not only from external pressure but also from severe organizational and structural deficiencies.

Over time, these weaknesses have steadily reduced the organization's ability to plan and execute large-scale military operations across different regions.

Al-Qaeda's inability to establish a sustainable and adaptable management structure remains among its most damaging weaknesses, said Muhammad Sarwar Naimat.

"Al-Qaeda has always depended on limited leadership circles," he said. "When those leaders were eliminated, the group fell into disorder and fragmentation."

Failures involving operational coordination, resource management and organized decision-making processes have significantly weakened al-Qaeda's ability sustaining direct warfare, he said.

Continuing weaknesses and strategic limitations

Analysts believe the same weaknesses undermining al-Qaeda's military campaigns will likely also weaken its newer influence-based operational strategy over time.

Internal disputes, fragmented regional branches, leadership crises and operational disunity continue limiting the organization's effectiveness despite changes in its broader strategic approach.

The network now concentrates heavily on ideological propaganda, psychological operations, media campaigns, covert networking and exploiting social grievances without entering costly military confrontations.

This transition primarily reflects al-Qaeda's declining military capabilities rather than evidence demonstrating renewed organizational strength or expanding operational influence.

Al-Qaeda now seeks shaping public perceptions, establishing covert relationships and exploiting political instability without maintaining extensive military visibility.

"The group is still trapped by internal divisions, geographic fragmentation and a leadership crisis. Such problems mean that even its softer and indirect strategy will eventually face erosion and failure," Ali Akbar Muhammadi said.